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This paper develops a general equilibrium Ricardian model with transaction costs to investigate the 
determinants of the firm’s sourcing decision.  It derives conditions under which different sourcing 
choices and corresponding trade patterns occur in general equilibrium.  These conditions suggest 
that, inter alia, the choice between vertical integration and specialisation depends on the relative 
internal transaction costs associated with vertical integration and external transaction costs 
associated with international outsourcing; and that the equilibrium sourcing structures and trade 
patterns are consistent with a refined theory of comparative advantage that incorporates the effects 
of transaction costs in international trade.  
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  1DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL SOURCING 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
In relation to sourcing an intermediate good, a final good producing firm makes two choices. First, 
it chooses an ownership structure, i.e., whether or not to vertically integrate into the production of 
the intermediate good.  Second, it chooses the production location of the intermediate good, i.e., 
whether the intermediate good should be produced in the firm’s home country or a foreign country 
or both.  The combination of the two choices can result in 6 different decision outcomes: 
 
(i)  Domestic integration: the firm vertically integrates and produces the intermediate good 
in its home country. 
(ii)  Foreign direct investment (FDI): the firm vertically integrates, and makes the 
intermediate good in a foreign country through FDI. 
(iii)  Domestic integration and FDI combined: the firm vertically integrates and produces the 
intermediate good both in the home country and in the foreign country through FDI.  
This decision may in part be due to the fact that the foreign country is too small to meet 
all of the firm’s demand for the intermediate good. 
(iv)  Domestic outsourcing: the firm does not vertically integrate, and buys the intermediate 
good from a specialised producer in the home country. 
(v)  Global outsourcing: the firm does not vertically integrate, and buys the intermediate 
good from a specialised producer in a foreign country. 
(vi)  Domestic and global outsourcing combined: the firm does not vertically integrate, and 
buys the intermediate good from both home country and foreign country.  This decision 
may in part be due to the fact that the foreign country is too small to meet all of the 
firm’s demand for the intermediate good. 
 
There is substantial evidence that both domestic and global outsourcing  (which involve the last 
three decision outcomes above) have become increasingly widespread in recent decades.  For 
instance, Abraham and Taylor (1996) documented rising subcontracting in 13 US industries.   
Feenstra (1998) showed that by a variety of measures, global outsourcing has increased 
significantly since the 1970s in many OECD countries.  Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), reported 
that international trade has grown faster in components than in final goods.  They also found that 
outsourcing accounted for 22% of US exports in 1997, and for 30% of the growth in the US export 
share of merchandise GDP between 1962 and 1997.  In addition, citing data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Antràs and Helpman (2004) suggested that the growth of foreign outsourcing 
by US firms might have outpaced the growth of their foreign intra-firm sourcing. 
 
  2What’s driving the growth in out-sourcing? How does a firm make its sourcing decisions?  
What trade-offs are involved?  How would firms’ sourcing decisions interact with consumer choices 
and how would the interactions affect consumption, production and trade patterns in equilibrium?   
These questions have attracted some attention in the literature.  For instance, following the 
seminal paper by Coase (1937), a large literature has emerged that studies a firm’s make-or-buy 
decision, examples of this literature include Williamson (1975, 1985), Grossman and Hart (1986), 
Yang and Ng (1995), and Grossman and Helpman (2002).  These studies focus on how asset 
specificity, transaction costs, and incomplete contracts may affect a firm’s decision of whether to 
produce an input in-house or to purchase it from the market, but do not consider the production 
location of the input, therefore do not shed light on the impact of sourcing decisions on 
international trade.  Another stream of literature, in contrast, takes a firm’s decision to outsource as 
given and examines the firm’s decision of where to outsource.  For instance, Gross and Helpman 
(2005) studied the determinants of the location of outsourcing activities in a general equilibrium 
trade model.  Still another stream of literature takes as given a firm’s decision to outsource 
overseas, and examines how this may impact on trade patterns and factor prices.  Some examples 
of this literature are Deardorff (2001) and Kohler (2001).   
 
While the literature cited above provides insights into various aspects of outsourcing, it does not 
simultaneously endogenise a firm’s decision to outsource and the location of sourcing.  As a result, 
it does not capture the impact of firms’ sourcing decisions and equilibrium patterns of production 
organization and trade flows.  Recognising this gap, Antràs and Helpman (2004) proposed a 
framework in which firms make endogenous organisational decisions.  Specifically, they developed 
a North-South model of international trade, in which firms decide whether to integrate into the 
production of intermediate inputs or outsource them, and from which country to source the inputs. 
Their model shows that in equilibrium firms with different productivity levels choose different 
ownership structure and locations of input production. 
 
Similar to Antràs and Helpman (2004), we develop a model that endogenises both a final-good 
producer’s decision whether to outsource and where to source its input.  However our model differs 
from Antràs and Helpman (2004) in three significant ways.   
 
Firstly, we adopt the familiar Ricardian model of comparative advantage whereas Antràs and 
Helpman develop a North-South model of trade with differentiated final product varieties.   
 
Secondly, Antràs and Helpman assume that only the North knows how to produce the final good, 
therefore in their model, the existence of international trade is exogenously given -otherwise 
consumers in the South cannot consume the final good.  Moreover, the pattern of trade flow is also 
  3exogenously given - the North exports final products in exchange of intermediate goods, or 
produces intermediate goods in the South, pays wages to the South which are used to buy final 
products from the North.  In contrast, our model endogenises both the existence and the pattern of 
trade or investment.  Depending on values of parameters (such as transaction costs in 
international trade, degree of comparative advantage, and production technology), autarky or 
international trade may occur in equilibrium.  Similarly different parameter values would lead to 
different patterns of trade between the two countries.  Either country may produce the final product, 
and/or the intermediate good in equilibrium.  
 
Thirdly, we emphasise different trade-offs in a firm’s sourcing decision. In choosing between 
domestic and foreign production of input, our model assumes that a final-good producer trades off 
the benefit of low transport costs against the benefit from technical comparative advantage.  In 
choosing between vertical integration and outsourcing, the final-good producer is assumed to trade 
off the benefit of lower transaction cost involved in hiring labour and internal control against 
economies from specialisation.  In comparison, Antràs and Helpman’s model focuses on the trade-
off between benefits of lower variable costs in the South against the benefit of lower fixed costs in 
the North, and between the benefits of ownership advantage against better incentive for 
independent supplier.  
 
We present our model in Section 2 and describe the equilibrium in Section 3.  In Section 4, we 
discuss the conditions under which different patterns of production organization, and trade patterns 
occur in general equilibrium.  We summarise the paper and discuss possible extension of the 
model in Section 5.  
 
2.   THE MODEL 
Consider a world economy with two countries, country one (the home country) and country two 
(the foreign country).  Country i has a labor force of Mi, (i = 1, 2).  Migration between the two 
countries is assumed to be prohibitively expensive.  There is a final consumption good Y which can 
be produced in either country and is produced using labor and an intermediate good X.  The 
intermediate good X can be produced in either country and is produced using only labor.  
2.1. Consumer  decision 
Consumers in both countries have the same preferences.  A representative consumer is endowed 
with one unit of labor.  The consumer receives a wage from employment and uses the wage to buy 
the consumption good Y.  Good Y can be bought from either the domestic market or the foreign 
market.  It is assumed that there is no transaction costs if the consumer buys domestically, but if 
  4he/she chooses to buy imports, a transaction cost will be incurred.  The decision problem for a 
representative consumer in country i is 
 
   Max:  ui = yi + kiyji  
 s.t. piy yi+ pjyyji
  = wi           
 
where yi is the quantities of the consumption good Y purchased from the domestic market;  yji
  is the 
quantities of the good imported (from country j to country i);  ki is the transaction efficiency coefficient 
in country i for importing good Y, ki ∈ [0, 1]; piy
 is the price of good Y bought domestically; pjy is the 
price of good Y imported;  wi is the wage level in country i.  The wage level in country 1 is assumed 
to be the numeraire, so that w1 = 1 and w2 = w. 
 
The specification of transaction cost efficiency coefficient assumes iceberg transaction costs, that is, 
for each unit of good Y imported by country i, a fraction 1-ki ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to have “melted” in 
transaction, only ki is received by the consumer.  Transaction costs are broadly specified to capture a 
variety of costs including transport costs, tariff regime and other institutional conditions affecting the 
cost of importing.   
 
If the price of imported final good Y is lower after transaction costs are taken into account, the 
consumer will buy imports; otherwise he/she will buy domestically.  The consumer’s decision, the 
price relationships and trade structures consistent with the decisions are summarised in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Consumer decision 
Decision criteria  Conditions  satisfying 
decision criteria 
Structure of trade in final 
goods 
21 1 12 /, / yy yy ppk pp k >< 2 2   12 / yy pp k <   12 121 2 0, 0, 0, 0 yy yy >= =>  
21 1 12 /, / yy yy ppk pp k >> 2 1
2 1
  212 /1 / yy kpp k <<   12 121 2 0, 0, 0, 0 yy yy >= >=  
21 1 12 /, / yy yy ppk pp k <>   12 /1 / yy pp k >   12 121 2 0, 0, 0, 0 yy yy = >> =  
 
 
To illustrate, the first row (below the headings) in Table 1 shows that if the price of imports including 
transaction costs is higher than domestic price in country 1 (i.e., p2y/p1y>k1), and if the price of imports 
including transaction costs is lower than domestic price in country 2 (i.e., p1y/p2y<k2), then the relative 
price would satisfy the condition that p1y/p2y<k2. Under this condition, consumers in country 1 will buy 
domestically (y1>0, y21 = 0), and consumers in country 2 will buy imports (y2=0, y12 > 0).   
 
  5Similarly the second row shows the situation where consumers in both countries choose to buy 
domestically, and the third row shows the situation where consumers in country 1 buy imports and 
those in country 2 buy domestically.  
 
2.2.   Firm decision 
2.2.1   Production of the final good 
A final-good producing firm makes two decisions: whether to vertically integrate into the production of 
intermediate good X, and where to source good X.   
 
If the firm chooses to vertically integrate, it can produce the intermediate good X either in its home 
country or overseas, or both.  If it chooses to produce overseas, an internal transaction cost will be 
incurred.  The internal transaction cost includes the transport cost and other cost associated with 
intra-firm importation of intermediate goods.  The production function of good Y for the representative 






where  aiy is the productivity coefficient in country i which captures the productivity difference in 
producing good Y between the two countries; xiv is the quantity of  intermediate good X produced 
domestically and xjiv is that produced overseas by the vertically integrated firm in country i;  tiv (tiv <1) 
is the internal transaction efficiency coefficient associated with foreign production by a vertically 
integrated firm in country i; and Liy is the amount of labor used in the production of good Y in country 
i.  
 
Similar to the transaction costs associated with importing final goods, the internal transaction costs 
are also assumed to take the iceberg form.  That is, for each unit of good X produced overseas by 
the integrated firm in country i, only tiv can be used in the final good production, the rest is lost in 
cross-boarder intra-firm transaction.   
 
If the firm chooses not to vertically integrate, it will become a specialised final-good producing firm 
and buy the intermediate good X domestically or import, or both.  If it chooses to import, an external 
transaction cost will be incurred.  The external transaction cost includes, for instance, the cost of 
searching for a supplier, transport costs and other costs associated with importation of intermediate 
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where xi is the amount of the intermediate good X purchased domestically and xji is that imported by 
the specialised final-good producing firm in country i; and ti is the external transaction efficiency 
coefficient for importing good X to country i.    
 
2.2.2  Production of the intermediate good 
 
The intermediate good X can be produced domestically or overseas by a vertically integrated firm, or 
it can be produced by a specialised X-producing firm.  If X is produced domestically by a vertically 
integrated firm in country i, the production function is 
 
xiv = aixLix 
 
where aix is the labor productivity coefficient for a vertically integrated firm in country i producing 
domestically; and Lix is the amount of labor in country i used in the production of X.  
 
If X is produced by a specialised X-producing firm in country i, the production function is 
 
xi = bixLix 
 
where bix is the labor productivity coefficient for a specialised X-producing firm in country i. 
 
If X is produced overseas by the vertically integrated firm, the production function is 
 
xjiv = bjxLjx 
 
where bjx is the labor productivity coefficient for a specialised firm in country j.  This specification 
assumes that if a vertically integrated firm sets up an input plant overseas, the plant will have the 
same productivity as a local specialised X-producing firm. 
 
Due to economies of specialisation, labor productivity in X production by a specialised firm is 
assumed to be higher than that in a vertically integrated firm, i.e., aix<bix.   
 
In deciding whether to vertically integrate and where to source the intermediate good X, a Y-
producing firm compares the unit costs of producing Y associated with different structural forms of 
production.   If a Y-producing firm in country i vertically integrates and produces X domestically, the 
unit cost function for good Y can be obtained by solving the cost minimisation problem: 
  7 
min ( ) ii x i y wL L +  
1 .. 1 , iy iv iy iv ix ix st a x L x a L
ββ − == 
 
The resultant unit cost function is 
11 () ( 1 ) ii i i y i x cw w aa
ββ β ββ
− −− − =− . 
 
Similarly we can obtain the unit cost functions for other structural forms of production.  These are 
summarised in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Unit cost functions for different structures of production 
Structures of production  Unit cost functions 
() ii v YX  
11 () ( 1 ) ii i i y i x cw w aa
ββ β ββ
− −− − =−  
() ( ) iv jv YX  11 (, ) ( 1 ) ii j i j i y i vj x cww w wat b
1 β ββ β β β ββ
− −− − − − =−  
() ii s YX  
11 (,) ( 1 ) ii xi i i x i y cpw w p a
1 β ββ ββ
β − −− − =−  
() ( ) is js YX  11 (, ) ( 1 ) ij x i i j x i y i cp w w pat
ββ β β β ββ
1 − −− − − =−  
 
 
In Table 2,   and  denote a vertically integrated firm in country  i producing X 
domestically and overseas, respectively; (  and () denote a specialized Y-producing 
firm in country i buying good X domestically and overseas, respectively.  
() ii v YX () ( ) iv jv YX
) ii s YX ( ) is js YX
 
A Y-producing firm will choose a structure of production that has the lowest unit cost.    The Y-
producing firms’ decision on production structures are summarised in Table 3.  
 
Compared to Table 2, Table 3 includes two additional production structures: structure   
denotes a vertically integrated firm produces X both domestically and overseas, and structure 
 denotes a specialised firm buys X both domestically and overseas.  The first structure 
is chosen when the costs of producing domestically and overseas are the same, and the second 
structure chosen when the costs of buying domestically and overseas are the same. 
() ( ) ii v j v YX X
() ( ) ii s j s YX X
  8Table 3: Firm’s decision on structures of production  
Optimal production 
structure 
Decision criteria  Conditions satisfying decision criteria 
() ii v YX   () (, ) ii ii j cw cww < , 
() ( ,) ii ii xi cw cp w < , 

















() ( ) iv jv YX  (, ) () ii j ii cww cw < , 
(, ) ( ,) ii j ii xi cww cp w < , 


















() ( ) ii v j v YX X   (, ) () ii j ii cww cw = , 
(, ) ( ,) ii j ii xi cww cp w < , 
(, ) ( ,) ii j i j xi cww cp w <  
ii x
















() ii s YX   (,) ( ) ii xi ii cpw cw < , 
(,) ( ,) ii xi ii j cpw cww < , 




















() ( ) is js YX  (, ) ( ) ij xi ii cp w cw < , 
(, ) ( , ij xi iij cp w cww < , 
(, ) (, ) i j xi ii xi cp w cpw <  
jx i




















() ( ) ii s j s YX X   (, ) ( ) ij xi ii cp w cw < , 
(, ) ( , ij xi iij cp w cww < , 
(, ) (, i j xi ii xi cp w cpw =  
jx i



















2.3. Possible trade structures 
Combining consumer decisions and firm decisions in both countries (see Table 1 and Table 3 
above), we can identify a set of trade structures that can occur in equilibrium and corresponding 
conditions that satisfy the optimisation of both consumer and firm decisions.  These are 
summarised in Table 4. 
 

































































































































































































































































































































































































= 12 2 () ( ) s s X YX  
  10The notation for trade structures in Table 4 is as follows.  The letters Xi, Yi (i = 1,2) in each bracket 
denote goods produced in country i; subscribes s and v denote that production is characterised by 
specialisation and vertical integration, respectively.    
 
3.   EQUILIBRIUM 
This section describes the general equilibrium of the model outlined in Section 2.  The possible 
general equilibrium trade structures and corresponding conditions for consumer and firm 
optimisation problems are already presented in Table 4.  However the conditions in Table 4 involve 
prices and wages, which are endogenous variables.  To describe the general equilibrium, these 
endogenous variables need to be solved, and the equilibrium conditions need to be expressed in 
terms of exogenous parameters of the model.  The solutions of these endogenous variables are 
obtained for each structure by taking the structure as given, and using the conventional general 




To illustrate, consider structure 12 () ( ) s s YX. In this structure, firms in country 1 specialise in 
producing good Y, they import the intermediate good X from specialised X-producers in country 2, 
and export the final good Y.   
 
First we look at consumer decision.  Given this structure, a representative consumer in 
country 2 buys good Y domestically, i.e., y21 = 0, thus the consumer decision problem 
simplifies to  
 
 Max:      11 uy =
s.t.    11 1 y py w =
 











                                                  
* The two-stage method of solving for general equilibrium was proposed by Yang and Ng (1993) and refined 
by Sun (2003), Sun, Yang and Zhu (2004).  It is sometimes referred to as  “inframarginal analysis” as the 
method comprises an “infra-marginal” stage of identifying economic structures and corresponding conditions 
using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of consumer and firm optimisation problems, as well as the standard stage 
of marginal analysis which solves for the equilibrium prices and quantities for each economic structure.  
  11In contrast, a representative consumer in country 2 only buys imports, i.e., y2=0, thus the 
consumer decision problem simplifies to  
 
 Max:      22 1 uk y = 2
s.t.    11 2 2 y py w =
 












Now we consider firm decisions.  Given this structure, the decision problem for the representative 
firm in country 1 is:   
 
y x y y y y
L x L w x p L x t a p Max
y
1 1 21 2
1




−β β π . 
 
The decision problem for the representative firm in country 2 is:  
 
2
22 2 22 max
x
2 x xx x x L p bL w L π =−  
 
The market clearing conditions for good Y and good X are:  
 
1 11 22







ββ − +=  
 
21 2 2 x x bM =  
 
Using the first-order conditions of the firms’ decisions in both countries, and the market clearing 
condition, we obtain the equilibrium prices and wages in for structure  12 () ( ) s s YX as follows: 
 






















11 2 1 (1 ) yy x 2 p ab t w
β ββ β ββ
−− − −− =−
β  
Taking a similar approach, we can solve for equilibrium prices and wages for other structures.  The 
results are summarised in Table 5.  
  12 
Table 5: Equilibrium prices and wages for all economic structures 
Structure Equilibrium  prices 
11 22 () ( ) vv YX YX   1 i w = ,    
11 (1 ) iy iy ix pa a
ββ β ββ
−− − − =−
11 22 () ( ) vs YX YX   1 i w = , 
1
22 x x pb
− = , 
11
11 1 (1 ) yy x pa a
β ββ ββ
− −− − =− , 
11
22 2 (1 ) yy x pa b
ββ β ββ
− −− − =−  
11 22 () ( ) s v YX YX   1 i w = , 
1
11 x x pb
− = , 
11
11 1 (1 ) yy x pa b
ββ β ββ
− −− − =− , 
11
22 2 (1 ) yy x pa a
β ββ ββ
− −− − =−  
11 22 () ( ) s s YX YX   1 i w = , 
1
ix ix p b
− = , 
11 (1 ) iy iy ix pa b
β ββ ββ
− −− − =−  
11 1 () ( ) s s YX X  























11 1 (1 ) yy x pa b
ββ β ββ
− −− − =− , 
1
22 2 (1 ) yy x
1
2 p ab w
ββ β ββ
−− − − =−  (shadow price) 
12 () ( ) s s YX 






















11 2 1 (1 ) yy x 2 p ab t w
β ββ β ββ






22 2 (1 ) yy x p ab w
ββ β ββ
−− − − =−  (shadow price) 
12 () ( ) vv YX 













11 2 1 (1 ) yy x v 2 p ab t w
β ββ β ββ






22 2 (1 ) yy x p ab w
ββ β ββ
−− − − =− (shadow price) 
11 2 () ( ) vv YX X  








= ,  
11
11 1 (1 ) yy x pa a
β ββ ββ
− −− − =− , 
1
22 2 (1 ) yy x
1
2 p ab w
ββ β ββ
−− − − =− (shadow price) 
12 2 () ( ) s s X YX  











11 x x pb











22 2 (1 ) yy x 2 p ab w
ββ β ββ
−− − − =− , 
11
11 1 (1 ) yy x pa b
ββ β ββ
− −− − =− (shadow price) 
12 () ( ) s s X Y  












11 x x pa
− = ,  
11
22 1 2 2 (1 ) yy x
1 p ab t w
β ββ β ββ
β − −− − − − =−, 
11
11 1 (1 ) yy x pa b
ββ β ββ
− −− − =− (shadow price) 
12 () ( ) vv X Y  












22 1 2 2 (1 ) yy x v
1 p ab t w
β ββ β ββ
β − −− − − − =−, 
11
11 1 (1 ) yy x pa b
ββ β ββ
− −− − =− (shadow price) 
12 2 () ( ) vv X YX  








= ,   
11
22 2 (1 ) yy x 2 p aa w
ββ β ββ
−− − − =− , 
11
11 1 (1 ) yy x pa b
ββ β ββ
− −− − =− (shadow price) 
  13In some of the structures where good Y is not produced domestically in one country, there is no 
actual domestic price for Y in that country.  We have calculated a “shadow” domestic price of Y for 
that structure, which is the price that would be if Y were to be produced domestically.
†  The 
shadow prices are information required for consumer decisions as to whether to buy domestically 
or abroad (refer to Table 1). 
 
4.   CHARACTERISTICS OF CONDITIONS FOR GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM STRUCTURES 
If we insert the equilibrium prices and wages in Table 5 into the conditions for consumer and firm 
optimisation problems set out in Table 4, we obtain the conditions under which each structure 
occurs in general equilibrium.  These are summarised in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Inframarginal comparative statics of general equilibrium 
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β − −− <<
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  12 () ( ) vv YX 
                                                  
† In calculation the shadow prices, we have assumed that if good Y were to be produced in that country, it 
would be produced by a specialised Y producer buying X domestically.  We consider this assumption to be 
reasonable given that production in that country is characterised by specialised X production by either its 
own firms or plants set up by integrated firms in the other country. 
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11 v tt > , 





















<   12 2 () ( ) s s X YX  
 
 
Note that the conditions of general equilibrium in effect partition the fifteenth dimension parameter 
space (  M ,, ix iy ix aab 1, M2, β, t1, t2, t1v, t2v, k1, k2) into subsets.  Within each parameter subset, a 
specific economic structure emerges as the general equilibrium structure.  For instance, the first row 





















, the structure  11 1 () ( ) s s YX X will emerge as the general equilibrium structure.  
  15 
It can be seen from Table 6 that 9 different economic structures each with different consumption, 
production and trade patterns can emerge in general equilibrium, these structures are: 
 
(1) the autarky structure  11 22 () ( ) s s YX YX , in which both countries produce both good X and 
good Y in specialised firms; there is no international trade.  Note that vertical integration 
cannot be a general equilibrium autarky structure because we assume the productivity of X 
in a specialised firm is higher than an integrated firm, and that there is zero domestic 
transaction cost in trading good X in the domestic market or internal control cost in 
producing X domestically.  In other words, there is no trade-off between economies of 
specialisation and low transaction costs, thus specialisation will be the dominant choice that 
occurs in equilibrium with no international trade. 
(2) The global outsourcing structures  12 () ( ) s s YXand 12 () ( ) s s X Y , in which firms in country 1 and 
country 2, respectively, specialise in producing Y and outsource the intermediate good X 
globally.   
(3) The FDI structures  and 12 () ( ) v YX v v 12 () ( ) v X Y , in which firms in country 1 and country, 
respectively, vertically integrate into X production and set up overseas plants to produce 
good X. 
(4) The mixed specialised structures  11 1 () ( ) s s YX X and 12 2 () ( ) s s X YX , in which firms in country 1 
and country 2, respectively, specialise in producing Y and outsource good X both 
domestically and globally. 
(5) The missed vertical structures  and 11 2 () ( ) vv YX X 12 2 () ( ) vv X YX , in which firms in country 1 
and country 2, respectively, vertically integrate into X production and produce good X both 
domestically and overseas.  
 
Which structure will occur in general equilibrium depends on which subsets the parameters fall into.  
Each parameter subset is defined in terms of technological comparative advantage in producing 








), intensity of intermediate good X 
used in the production of good (β ), transaction efficiency associated with international trade in 
good Y (k1, k2), internal transaction efficiency associated with producing X overseas by a vertically 
integrated firm (t1v, t2v), external transaction efficiency associated with importing good X (t1, t2), and 







  16The interactions of the parameters are complex, however, some general conclusions can be drawn 
from the results presented in Table 6.   The first conclusion is the general statement that the 
general equilibrium structure is determined by the interaction of parameters, specifically, we have 
 
Proposition 1  Depending on the values of parameters, different economic structures can occur in 
general equilibrium.  The general equilibrium structure may involve autarky where there is 
international trade in neither final goods nor intermediate goods; or specialised final good 
producers engaging in global outsourcing or both domestic and global outsourcing of intermediate 
good; or vertically integrated producers engaging in  global production (through FDI) or both of 
domestic and global production of intermediate good.  
 
Note that in Table 6 the first column compares the internal transaction efficiency of a vertically 
integrated firm and the external transaction efficiency of a specialised firm.  It is clear from Table 6 
that when internal transaction efficiency is lower than external transaction efficiency in a country 
(tiv<ti), firms in that country do not choose vertical integration in general equilibrium.  For instance, 
the first block of 5 structures in Table 6 are all characterised by firms in country 1 being specialised 
producers of X and or Y.   Thus we have  
 
Proposition 2  The choice between vertical integration and specialised production of final goods 
depends on the relative size of the internal transaction efficiency associated with vertical 
integration and external transaction efficiency associated with specialised production.  Ceteris 
paribus, an increase in external transaction efficiency increases the likelihood that specialised 
production of final goods occurs in general equilibrium.  
 
It should be noted that our model assumes zero transaction costs in domestic trading, that is the 
domestic transactions efficiency of good X is one. Thus the trade-off between vertical integration 
and specialisation characterised in proposition 2 is more precisely the trade-off between vertically 
integration with production of good X overseas, and the specialisation with good X imported.
‡  
Nevertheless, Proposition 2 still captures the idea put forward by Cheung (1983) that the boundary 
of the firm is determined by the relative transaction efficiency in trading intermediate goods 
(external transaction efficiency in our model) and the transaction cost of hiring labor to produce the 
intermediate goods internally (internal transaction efficiency in our model).  
 
                                                  
‡ If we introduce transaction costs in domestic trade and production in both countries, the definition of 
parameter subsets will be more complex as there will be four additional parameters.  However the general 
conclusions of the model will be the same except that 3 additional autarky structures may emerge which are 
characterised by at least one country vertically integrating into X production.  
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two goods X and Y, taking into account different types of transaction costs.  Notice that due to 
positive transaction costs, international trade does not always occur in equilibrium.  However if 
international trade does occur in equilibrium, the direction of trade flow in our model is consistent 
with Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, which predicts that a country will export the good 
it has comparative advantage in producing.   For instance, the first cell of column 2 indicates that 
country 2 has comparative advantage in good X, the corresponding equilibrium structures are 
characterised by country 2 exporting good X.   Thus we have 
 
Proposition 3   If the extent of comparative advantage is not sufficient to outweigh the 
transaction costs associated with international trade, the general equilibrium structure will be 
autarky.  If comparative advantage is sufficiently large such that international trade occurs in 
equilibrium, then the direction of trade flow will be such that each trading country exports the good 
that it has a comparative advantage in producing. 
 
Proposition 3 highlights a distinct feature of our model, which is its ability to endogenize the 
emergence of international trade as well as the consumption and trade pattern and production 
organisations. 
 
Finally, the third column of Table 6 is a measure of the relative production capacity of the 
intermediate good between the two countries.  The relative production capacity is determined by 
the relative size of the labor force, relative productivity in X production and the intensity of X used 
in the production of Y.   From the results in Table 6, we get 
 
Proposition 4 If the production capacities of the intermediate good in the two countries are 
balanced, complete international specialisation (i.e., each country producing only one good) may 
occur in equilibrium.  If the production capacities are out of balance, the country with a larger 
capacity will produce both goods in equilibrium and the equilibrium structure will involve the larger 
country either outsourcing both domestically and abroad, or producing the intermediate good both 
domestically and overseas. 
 
5.   CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have developed a general equilibrium model of domestic and global sourcing.  
The model adapts the traditional Ricardian model of international trade to analyse production and 
trade in intermediate goods, and introduces three types of transaction costs to the model: the 
transaction costs associated with international trade in final goods, the external transaction costs 
associated with international outsourcing of intermediate goods, and the internal transaction costs 
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model endogenises the decision as to whether or not to vertically integrate and the location of 
intermediate good production.  It also endogenises the emergence of international trade in 
equilibrium. 
 
The main conclusions of our model are summarised in four propositions.  In summary form, our 
model suggests that (1) depending on parameter values, different equilibrium structures may occur 
in general equilibrium; (2) the choice between vertical integration and specialisation depends on 
the comparison or relative sizes of external transaction costs of outsourcing and internal 
transaction costs of production; (3) international trade will occur in equilibrium if the extent of 
comparative advantage outweighs the transaction costs of international trade. The direction of 
trade flow will be such that each country exports the good it has comparative advantage in; and (4) 
complete international specialisation is possible if the production capacities of the trading countries 
are balanced; otherwise the country with a larger capacity will produce both goods domestically.  
 
Despite the relative simplicity in the logical structure of our model, the model is able to derive a rich 
set of conclusions.  This suggests to us that the underlying structure of the traditional Ricardian 
model is a powerful tool for analyzing a wide range of issues in international trade.  For instance, 
our model can be extended to include different types of labor to analyze the impact of international 
outsourcing on wage dispersion between skilled and unskilled labor.  A further extension is to 
introduce the difference in labor market institutions to the model and investigate how labor market 
institutions interact with international trade to affect wages for skilled and unskilled labor. 
  19REFERENCES 
Abraham, Katharine G., and Susan K. Taylor (1996), “Firm’s use of outside contractors, theory and 
evidence”,  Journal of Labor Economics, 14, 394-424.  
Antras, Pol and Helpman, Elhana (2004), “Global Sourcing”, Journal of Political Economy, 112(3), 
552-580. 
Cheung, Steven (1983), “The Contractual Nature of the Firm”, The Journal of Law and Economics, 
1, 1-21.  
Coase, Ronald (1937), “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, 4, 386-405. 
Deardorff, Alan V. (2001), “Fragmentation in simple trade models”, North American Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 12, 121-137.  
Feenstra, Robert C. (1998), “ Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global 
Economy”,  Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (4), 31-50.  
Grossman, Gene M;  Helpman, Elhanan (2002), “Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry 
Equilibrium”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (1), 85-120. 
Grossman, Gene M; Helpman, Elhanan (2005), “Outsourcing in a Global Economy”, Review of 
Economic Studies, 72(1), 135-159. 
Grossman, Sanford and Hart, Oliver (1986), “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration”, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719. 
Hummels, David, Jun Ishii, and Kei-Mu Yi (2001), “The nature and growth of vertical specialization 
in world trade”,  Journal of International Economics, 54, 75-96. 
Kohler, Wilhelm (2001), “A specific-factors view on outsourcing”, North American Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 12, 31-53.   
Sun, Guang-Zhen (2003), “Identification of Equilibrium Structures of Endogenous Specialisation: A 
Unified Approach Exemplified,” in Yew-Kwang Ng, He-Ling Shi, and Guang-Zhen Sun, 
eds.,  The Economics of e-Commerce and Networking Decisions: Applications and 
Extensions of Inframarginal Analysis. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 195-213. 
Sun, Guang-Zhen, Yang, Xiaokai and Zhou, L. (2004), “General Equilibria in Large Economies with 
Endogenous Structure of the Division of Labor.” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 55(2), 237-256. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New 
York, NY: Free Press.  
Williamson, Oliver E (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, NY: Free Press.  
  20 
Yang, Xiaokai and Yew-Kwang Ng (1993), Specialisation and Economic Organisation, a New 
Classical Microeconomic Framework, Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Yang, Xiaokai and Yew-Kwang Ng (1995), “Theory of the firm and structure of residual rights”,  
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 26, 107-128. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  21